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Welfare and Warfare: American Organized Labor Approaches the Military-
Industrial Complex, 1949--1964  
Edmund F. Wehrle 
 
Historians have been almost unanimous in condemning American organized labor's 
postwar relationship with the military-industrial complex.(1) Most follow Nelson 
Lichtenstein's assessment of a movement sacrificing militancy in favor of a junior 
partnership in a corporate state dominated by employers and the state. This capitulation 
legitimized managerial authority, validated a regressive economic system, and latched 
labor's wagon to a reactionary foreign policy and an emerging garrison state(2) This latter 
relationship, in particular, has galled critics of American organized labor. By the 1970s, 
they could assert, as did even "labor priest" Monsignor Charles Owen Rice, that labor had 
become a "lackey of militarism."(3) 
In the postwar period, most trade unions supported the overall contours of U.S. official 
policy--from trade liberalization, to the Cold War, to the expansion of the military-
industrial complex--but this article argues that decisions made by organized labor leaders 
must be understood within the context of increasingly limited options. After World War 
II, organized labor faced a host of hostile forces. In the absence of alternatives, the 
mainstream of organized labor embraced defense spending for the jobs it provided and 
for the influence that labor might wield in the semi-public defense-sector economy. 
Beginning in the late 1940s, organized labor developed and promoted its own separate 
vision of the "warfare state," in which defense dollars, in the absence of other public 
funding, would be harnessed to address pressing social and economic needs. Trade 
unionists promoting these initiatives clashed severely with military officials and civilian 
businessmen recruited to streamline, systematize, and rationalize the emerging military-
industrial complex. Ultimately, they met with only temporary, limited success. But in 
labor's actions and agenda can be found evidence of a realistic approach to shaping and 
humanizing the complex postwar economy--an approach aimed at addressing the human 
impact of capitalism rather than slavishly following the logic of the market(4) 
Students of labor history, it is hoped, will find in this study a realistic context in which to 
assess the actions of organized labor's approach to defense policy. For students of civil-
military relations, it suggests something of the competing visions and forces shaping 
military policy and the emerging military-industrial complex. 
Postwar Opportunity and Disappointment  
The roots of labor's campaign to shape the national security state can be found in two 
interrelated developments: the eclipsing of labor's voluntaristic approach to the state in 
favor of a more cooperative model, and the embrace by labor of an economic outlook that 
can best be described as Social Keynesianism.(5) Inspired by the New Deal, many 
progressive unionists, especially those associated with the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), were attracted to the potential of greater labor/state cooperation and 
planning. However, the confusion and politics of World War II planning, in which labor 
often saw its voice drowned out by business interests, cooled enthusiasm for such 
corporate endeavors. Increasingly, both the CIO and the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL), with its more conservative orientation toward skilled workers, turned instead to 
the promise of a pluralistic state and Keynesian economics, in which government played 
a defined and confined role. 
To some historians, in this period, organized labor made an unfortunate retreat from 
larger goals of social justice and planned economics in favor of material gains through 
collective bargaining and a closer relationship with the Democratic Party.(6) Such a view, 
however, ignores the hostile political and economic climate facing organized labor in the 
immediate postwar years. A wave of bitter strikes in 1946 fed a public backlash, 
culminating in a conservative takeover of Congress that year. Truman's Fair Deal welfare 
initiatives quickly collapsed, and business launched an aggressive campaign to regain 
prerogatives under assault since the inception of the New Deal. (7) The flood of bad news 
for labor crested with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Meanwhile, racial 
tensions on the job, the ravages of inflation, and rising material expectations all added to 
the mounting discontent of American workers. A sharp recession in 1949, during which 
the unemployment rate nearly doubled to 8 percent, fueled the fire. Organized labor had 
real reason to fear the return of Depression conditions. 
Relief came, expectedly, in the form of a new, more intense phase of the Cold War. 
Truman's national security staff, aided by labor-friendly economist Leon Keyserling, 
drafted NSC-68 in 1949, calling for major increases in defense spending--a buildup 
Keyserling insisted would invigorate rather than burden the economy. (8) With 
diminishing options for a social Keynesian spending program, the mainstream of 
organized labor embraced military Keynesianism. The shift fit the conservative tenor of 
the times. "Military spending doesn't really alter the structure of the economy.... But the 
kind of welfare and public-works spending that Truman plans ... creates new institutions. 
It redistributes income," opined Business Week in 1949.(9) Business leaders were clearly 
more open to military Keynesianism than to its social-spending alternative. Planners in 
the organized labor movement, however, plotted to turn Business Week 's equation on its 
head--to harness defense spending to address pressing economic and social problems. 
Already, Amalgamated Clothing Workers President Sidney Hillman had offered a 
prototype for such plans in the days leading to Pearl Harbor. As a member of the National 
Defense Advisory Council (NDAC), in 1940, he developed a program aimed at directing 
defense mobilization dollars to areas and industries still suffering from the Great 
Depression. While the NDAC, after some reluctance, issued a statement endorsing 
Hillman's plan, longstanding hostility between organized labor and the military--which 
historian Paul Koistinen described as "rife with virulent labor-haters"--combined with the 
pressure of wartime mobilization to thwart labor's hopes for implementing the plan. (10) 
Facing recession and a hostile political scene, labor took a renewed interest in Hillman's 
plan. An embrace of military Keynesianism appealed to labor on a number of levels. A 
firm Cold War posture appealed to the vehement anticommunism of many trade 
unionists. Likewise, the defense sector operated partly in the public sphere, and as such 
was less driven by market forces and more open to political influence. (11) In the face of 
determined opposition, this semipublic realm, many in labor believed, offered the only 
realistic venue through which to pursue socially conscious, equitable economic growth. 
War and Opportunity  
The unexpected arrival of war in Korea in June 1950 gave labor the opportunity to pursue 
its agenda for defense spending. Dedicated to a vision of pluralistic governance, trade 
union leaders resolved to have influence in shaping the defense buildup--a real voice that 
would not be drowned out by competing interests, as they believed had been the case 
during World War II. (12) Although at times seeming to resent the power and influence 
of trade unions, President Truman understood the debt he owed labor for his 1948 
surprise victory and sought to build support for his Korean initiative. Initially, he 
welcomed trade union participation in defense planning and sought to provide labor with 
the influence it demanded. (13) 
The AFL and CIO--putting aside their often bitter differences--formed a joint committee, 
the United Labor Policy Committee, to coordinate a response to the crisis. Truman 
ordered each major defense agency to take on a labor advisor. A Committee on Defense 
Manpower and National Labor-Management Policy, with several labor representatives, 
convened within the Labor Department to oversee the nation's manpower requirements. 
(14) Trade unionists on the committee seized it as a forum to advocate policies directing 
spending to "labor surplus areas. “ (15) Jacob Potofsky, Hillman's successor as president 
of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, for instance, aggressively pressed for accelerated 
procurement of textiles and policies that would mandate "respect for labor standards" in 
the awarding of contracts. (16) 
Human impact, insisted Potofsky, alongside concerns for optimal efficiency and lowest 
cost must be weighed in the awarding of contracts. Potofsky aimed specifically to aid the 
severely slumping textile industry, and, by mandating labor standards, slow the drain of 
textile jobs to the non-unionized South. His agenda, however, went well beyond the 
textile industry. Ultimately, trade unionists sought to commandeer the growing defense 
establishment--to make it as responsive to the goals of promoting employment and 
addressing social needs as to fighting the Cold War. 
During the first several months of the Korean mobilization, organized labor aggressively 
pursued its defense-spending agenda. By late 1950, however, it became clear to Truman 
that the war would last longer than he had hoped and that full mobilization required 
greater organization and centralized authority. In a sweeping move, the president 
consolidated control of defense production in one office under General Electric President 
Charles Wilson. Trade unionists feared that a businessman commanding so central and 
powerful a position might prove an obstacle to their initiatives. Their fears were 
immediately realized. Taking office, Wilson established his own manpower policy 
committee staffed with non-labor advisers. He permitted the labor-management 
committee to continue its work-but it was to operate only in an advisory capacity. 
Committee members fumed at Wilson's autocratic approach. When they met on 13 
February 1951, their anger boiled over. Fearing that his efforts to accelerate textile 
procurement and address other economic problems were in vain, Potofsky incited 
members to dissolve their committee in protest. (17) 
Wilson's strike at pluralistic governance continued to reverberate. "There is absolutely no 
desire on the part of Mobilization Director Charles Wilson to give labor a real voice in 
the formulation of defense policy," complained the joint AFL and CIO United Labor 
Policy Committee. It soon called for labor representatives in all other defense 
mobilization agencies to "resign immediately.” (18) Although controversy over wage and 
price stabilization contributed to the walkout, labor's strong desire to shape manpower 
and procurement decisions was the primary motivation. (19) The walkout was to be a 
clear statement--unlike the previous war, this time trade unionists were hell-bent on 
having a real policy-making role. The walkout quickly revealed the president to be a fair 
weather friend. "There is a conspiracy between labor and management to gouge the 
country," bristled Truman to his cabinet. (20) 
Still, the president felt pressured by labor's political influence and the national 
emergency. He, in turn, pressured Wilson. After several months of standoff, in late April 
1951, the mobilization czar capitulated and granted substantial, substantive labor 
participation on policy-making bodies. (21) 
Wilson's concession provided organized labor with a well-situated forum to put forth its 
agenda; hence, labor dropped its boycott. But as the Office of Defense Mobilization 
hashed out the new representation arrangement, all sides recognized that the CIO and 
AFL remained too divided to share power effectively. Instead, one labor office was 
established within the Defense Production Agency, headed by AFL Vice President 
Joseph Keenan, while a separate office was created in the National Production Authority 
(NPA) under O. A. Knight of the Oil Workers-CIO. The arrangement caused problems of 
"over-lapping authority," but it limited rivalries. (22) 
From their new forums, labor officials did achieve some real, although admittedly not 
overwhelming, success in shaping defense policy-in particular, harnessing war 
mobilization to address the problem of depressed areas and industries. Of the two offices, 
the CIO's Labor Office in the NPA quickly proved the more aggressive. Knight's staff 
immediately moved to line up support from congressmen in labor surplus areas, i.e., 
regions with high unemployment. They conducted well-publicized meetings with 
delegations of unemployed workers, such as CIO textile workers from hard-hit Lawrence, 
Massachusetts. The NPA's message was clear: regrettable idleness existed at a time of 
national emergency and mobilization. Building on its public relations campaign, the labor 
office commissioned a survey of area unemployment conducted in the fall of 1951. The 
study--focusing on the plight of Belmont and lower Jefferson counties in Ohio, which 
were coincidentally the district of influential congressman Wayne Hayes, who 
desperately sought help for his beleaguered constituency--uncovered distressing 
unemployment and economic stagnation. (23) 
The release of the survey, essentially the Office of Labor's opening salvo, was not greeted 
warmly by military officials, who were reluctant to take on the additional burden of broad 
economic planning. During World War II, military officials resolutely resisted 
cooperation with organized labor, moving instead to cement what Brian Waddell recently 
called a "corporate-military alliance.” (24) During the Korean War, the alliance seemed 
to hold. The Army had no authority, military officials claimed, to award contracts on any 
basis other than lowest cost. The Office of Labor countered by producing an apparently 
forgotten memorandum written the previous year by Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall, in which the secretary advised that "availability of manpower in distressed 
employment areas or in areas of manpower shortages" should be among the factors 
considered in defense procurement. (25) Finally, the debate went to the Comptroller 
General who ruled in favor of the Nap's view. (26) 
With building political pressure from labor and interested congressmen, Wilson issued 
Defense Manpower Policy #4 (DMP#4) on 7 February 1952. (27) The policy granted 
special consideration to regions officially designated "labor surplus areas" by the 
existence of an unemployment rate of 6 percent or more. On paper at least, trade 
unionists working on mobilization agencies, in spite of resistance from both the military 
and business interests, had achieved their goal: they had a policy essentially imposing 
their socially conscious agenda on the military-industrial complex. While initiatives of 
various sorts to influence defense spending were hardly novel, DMP#4 broke new ground 
as a formal, government-issued policy. For that alone it was significant. 
Having a policy on the books, however, was only half the battle-implementing it involved 
a whole new struggle. Armed with the new policy, O. A. Knight's able assistant, veteran 
CIO staffer Ted Silvey, who handled the day-to-day operations of the Office of Labor, 
took the initiative. The most pressing issue was how to award contracts under the new 
system. Silvey advocated a procedure in which contracts or portions of defense contracts 
would be "set aside" for labor surplus area firms and regions. Procurement officers were 
to negotiate set-aside contracts directly with firms in distressed areas with every effort 
made to keep bids within the general price range of the open bidding process. However, 
the Department of Defense simply chose to ignore Wilson's directive. Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Anna Rosenberg--dismissively explaining that she did not believe DMP#4 
placed the Defense Department under any obligation to direct contracts to areas where 
unemployment was not a result of defense conversion--refused to attend meetings dealing 
with DMP#4 procedures. (28) 
In spite of determined resistance to the policy, the tireless dedication of Silvey and other 
laborites eventually resulted in the military's acceptance of two methods to direct 
spending to surplus areas. The first arrangement offered firms in labor surplus areas the 
opportunity to meet the lowest bid on a certain contract if bids came within 20 percent of 
the lowest bid. The second method reserved contracts or portions of contracts for labor 
surplus areas. This procedure did not require a contractor in such an area to meet a lowest 
bid, although some bidding and negotiations still took place. The mandate that human 
needs and macroeconomic planning be factored into contract decisions, so that defense 
contracting operated somewhat outside of the bounds of strict market forces, galled many 
in the military. Laborites, however, felt they had found a force to soften the cold 
inequalities of the market. 
To counterbalance military indifference, both the Defense Production Agency and the 
NPA aggressively promoted the new system of distressed area preferences. The NPA 
sponsored clinics in twenty-four cities in an effort to place contracts. Meanwhile, the 
DPA created a Defense Distressed Areas Task Force aimed particularly at helping 
slumping Detroit take advantage of defense contracts. (29) The NAP Office of Labor 
exerted influence in other ways as well. It helped, for instance, ease raw materials 
restrictions to keep workers on their jobs at Oneida, Ltd., a flatware and silver 
manufacturer located in a labor surplus area in upstate New York. (30)   
Within a year, Silvey and Knight were relatively pleased with their progress. Between 
late March and December 1952, procurement officers awarded more than $1.5 billion in 
defense contracts to surplus areas, although only roughly $48 million involved 
preferential arrangements. Of sixty localities originally certified as surplus areas, the 
situations in twenty-one of the sixty already allowed for their removal from the distressed 
list by March 1953. Beyond this, Silvey held that the Office of Labor's education 
outreach efforts had paid off simply by advising firms in distressed areas of available 
contracts, often awarded with winning bids without preferences. With increased public 
relations and greater cooperation from the Defense Department, Silvey and associates 
hoped that preferences could draw even more dollars into distressed areas. (31) 
In practice, however, numerous procedural problems complicated the process. For 
instance, procurement officers often accepted multiple bids on the same products at 
different price levels. When firms in distressed areas were extended the opportunity to 
meet bids, Silvey in the Office of Labor argued that a labor surplus area bid need meet 
only the highest bid, whereas military procurement officers insisted on the lowest bid. An 
ongoing battle on this and a plethora of other issues continued to rage between organized 
labor and the military. 
Beyond administrative tensions, the benefits of the preference programs seemed to 
bypass certain industrial areas. DMP#4, for instance, did little to aid the textile industries 
in distressed New England, where unemployment had soared as firms moved South in 
search of cheaper labor. Dismay at the faltering New England textile firms originally had 
inspired Potofsky and others with the plan to aid distressed areas. By early 1952, 
however, the textile industry was in a deep depression, and New England mills were 
hardest hit. Worsted and woolen mills in New England operated at roughly 40 percent 
capacity. (32) Regional tensions, however, impeded efforts to help the collapsing 
industry. Before preferences could be granted, the rules governing DMP#4 required a 
national public hearing to assess the impact of regional preferential treatment on the 
national health of the particular industry. With the textile industry split between the 
largely unorganized South and the dying Northern mills, the industry hearing on 20 
March 1952 yielded a bitter stalemate. In place of preferences for particular regions, the 
Office of Defense Mobilization developed a weak compromise formula, favoring plants 
operating eighty hours or fewer per week. But the eighty-hour arrangement proved nearly 
impossible to administer. Factories working at limited capacity struggled to meet lowest 
bids, and, with regional tensions flaring, the Defense Department chose simply to 
disregard the preferential policy when it came to textiles. (33) Nor could trade unionists 
muster broad popular support for the programs, with attention diverted in 1952 by 
President Truman's seizure of the steel industry and a subsequent fifty-three-day strike by 
steelworkers after the Supreme Court ruled the president's actions unconstitutional. (34) 
With New England textile towns such as Lawrence nearing extinction, Ted Silvey stewed 
angrily. "To exclude the textile industry entirely from area preference," Silvey wrote to 
the acting head of Defense Mobilization, "would not assure giving aid where it is needed 
most. ... the Communist party has seized on the acute distress in Lawrence for 
propaganda purposes as evidenced by their attempts to attract people to a communist 
rally in that city." Not even Silvey's evocation of the "great fear," however, could help 
New England's textile industry. (35) The Office of Labor continued to press the issue, but 
the collapse of the textile industry in New England continued largely unabated. (36) 
The frustrations of working through an uncooperative military underscored for many 
trade unionists the limits of preferential programs. Real change required a more 
fundamental commitment to full-employment policies. But such a commitment remained 
unlikely, with the country still very much in a conservative mood. In the absence of 
social Keynesian alternatives, DMP#4 offered vital, albeit limited, aid to struggling 
industries, communities, and people. 
 
"I've Always Liked Bird-Dogs Better Than Kennel-Fed Dogs"  
By early 1953, the conflict in Korea was winding down, and Americans had elected 
Dwight Eisenhower as their president partly on his promise to lift wartime controls on the 
economy. Republicans also took control of the Senate, essentially dooming social welfare 
legislation. The new president brought to the executive branch a more conservative fiscal 
approach and real skepticism about ballooning defense expenditures. Eisenhower was no 
Keynesian--not even a military Keynesian. 
Things took a downward turn for labor's defense agenda almost immediately. With the 
national emergency over, the National Production Authority's Office of Labor disbanded 
on 13 April 1953. As a result, labor lost its position on the inside policy-making track--a 
bureaucratic niche it never regained. Trade unionists could only hope that Eisenhower 
was sincere during the campaign when he told unemployed textile workers in Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, that he favored preferential programs. (37) In office, however, 
Eisenhower appeared to forget his promise. On 19 August 1953, the Office of Defense 
Mobilization suspended all preferential policies in the granting of defense contracts. 
Eisenhower's critics enjoyed dismissing his cabinet as "nine millionaires and a plumber." 
During his brief tenure in office, the plumber, Secretary of Labor Martin Durkin, tried to 
develop new policies to favor depressed areas, but the conservative atmosphere in the 
new administration frustrated his labors. By late 1953, however, the economy was losing 
steam. Reconversion from the war and Eisenhower's insistence on cutting spending, 
particularly defense spending, weakened the economy. Unemployment edged upward, 
and the president worried that he, like the previous Republican in office, might be blamed 
for a depression. In a pattern that repeated itself with every economic downturn, labor 
used the slowdown as a pretext to call for higher defense spending and a revival of 
DMP#4. Just after Christmas, Eisenhower issued a memorandum urging federal agencies 
to cooperate in a renewed effort by the Office of Defense Mobilization to place defense 
contracts in labor surplus areas. (38) 
Opponents of preferences, however, refused to stand by idly. The threatened return of 
preferential treatment in granting contracts stirred a minor upheaval among southern 
senators. Senator William Fulbright (Democrat-Arkansas) worried that the policies 
"opened the door to all kinds of favoritism." Senator Burnet R. Maybank of South 
Carolina called the president's initiatives "outrageous." But perhaps the scales were 
tipped when William Knowland, the leader of the Senate Republicans from California (a 
state in which one-third of nonagricultural workers depended on defense industries), 
added his voice to those protesting preferences. (39) Sensing trouble, Eisenhower 
retreated. On 15 January 1954, the president noted to reporters certain 
"misapprehensions" about his advocacy of preferences and dismissed the "exaggerated 
idea that entire contracts would be shoved somewhere just because they had 
unemployment.” (40) 
Eisenhower did implement a scaled-down version of preferences, but-as developments 
during the Korean War suggested--policy initiatives and directives by themselves 
accomplished little. Success required inside bureaucratic vigilance and affirmative action. 
With no core of activists in the Eisenhower administration and virtually no support from 
the executive, failure was almost guaranteed. In the first quarter of 1954, defense 
contracts awarded through preferences amounted to only a meager $163,149. Textile 
preferences amounted to only $16,214--virtually nothing. (41) 
Charles Wilson (not to be confused with the Charles Wilson in charge of the Defense 
Mobilization under Truman), Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense and the former chairman 
of the board of General Motors, underscored the half-hearted nature of Eisenhower's 
efforts on behalf of distressed areas. During a tour of the West, Wilson likened workers 
who called for area preferences to "kennel dogs" who sit on their "fanny and yell" for 
defense dollars. "I've always liked bird-dogs better than kennelfed dogs myself," the 
secretary added. Wilson's comments drew both headlines and a sharp rebuke from AFL 
President George Meany who assailed Eisenhower's "big business administration.” (42) 
Yet it was clear that the Defense Department was no longer even mildly committed to 
pursuing initiatives such as Defense Policy #4. (43) 
With the door essentially shut on preference programs, organized labor turned to the 
more generalized tier of its approach to the military-industrial complex. Still committed 
to promoting pro-growth military Keynesian spending, labor continued its call for overall 
increases in defense outlays, which it believed fueled economic growth and spurred 
recovery from downturns. (44) A stable, growing economy, lifting workers into a more 
secure middle-class existence, remained the primary goal of postwar labor; defense 
spending offered a viable route to that destination. 
After several good economic years following the recovery from the 1954 recession, tight 
fiscal and monetary policies led to a second Eisenhower recession in late 1957 and into 
1958. By the spring of 1958, the Labor Department had added twenty-one communities 
to its list of areas with substantial labor surpluses (unemployment rates of over 6 
percent), including Youngstown, Ohio; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and St. Louis, Missouri. 
Nationally, unemployment quickly soared above 7 percent. With workers losing their 
jobs and the administration seemingly indifferent, labor vocally demanded action. In 
March, Eisenhower reluctantly agreed to meet with an eight-man AFL-CIO delegation. 
The group aggressively pressed the president for public works and defense spending, 
along with a recommended tax cut and expanded federal unemployment insurance. The 
president demurred. (45) 
The Soviet launching of Sputnik several months later, however, forced the president to 
rethink his position. With the recession still strangling growth, George Meany moved to 
conscript Cold War fears for his economic agenda. Unemployment, he warned, "could 
very well lead to a situation for which the Kremlin has been hoping and expecting--the 
collapse of the U.S. domestic economy which could give the Soviet Union a victory over 
us without firing a shot.” (46) Noting the concurrent domestic and international crises, in 
February 1958, the AFL-CIO Executive Council argued that in each problem lay the 
solution to the other. With America's military superiority clearly "slipping" and the 
national economy "declining ... idle factories and machines" were "robbing us of billions 
of dollars of potential production of military and civilian goods," claimed the council. 
The administration, however, remained mired in "penny pinching and budget-balancing." 
Assailing Eisenhower's cutbacks in aircraft, ships at sea, and active personnel, the AFL-
CIO declared that "the time is now--not tomorrow--for a bold program to lift the 
economy out of its slump and national defense out of its dangerous lag ... Prosperity and 
strong national defense are both feasible.” (47) 
Eisenhower--privately bemoaning "Sputnik complexes"--met the federation halfway, 
approving defense increases of roughly $1.1 billion in 1958 and requesting a $5 billion 
increase in the national debt limit, thus easing his restrictive fiscal policies. (48) At the 
same time, the Federal Reserve Board reacted to pressure by easing the discount rate, 
another demand of organized labor. (49) Eisenhower's new outlays, combined with new 
expenditures for a federal highway system and other spending, pulled the country out of 
the recession, at least temporarily. Before Congress the next year, United Auto Workers 
President Walter Reuther credited the recovery to increased defense spending. (50) 
Sputnik and the recession offered an indelible lesson to labor and Keynesians: while 
unemployment alone failed to bring government to action, economic worries combined 
with a national security crisis, such as that provided by Sputnik, created a climate ripe for 
spending initiatives. (51) 
Operation Booster  
Laborites greeted the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 with high hopes of more 
vigorous spending policies to spur economic growth. Representing Massachusetts in 
Congress, Kennedy had been both a benefactor and beneficiary of programs such as 
DMP#4. During the 1960 election, Kennedy profited from a staggering economy and a 
general sense that America was losing the Cold War. His campaign vow "to get America 
moving again" and to expand American military capabilities resonated strongly with 
trade unionists. 
The help was very much needed. Rising unemployment and the second recession in three 
years as Kennedy took office greatly concerned labor. "The country stands today on the 
threshold of the gravest economic crisis since the great depression of the thirties," George 
Meany warned Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn in early 1961.52 Alongside higher 
defense spending, the AFL-CIO called for a thirty-five-hour week and an aggressive 
public works program. The twin factors of a sympathetic president and an economic 
downturn boded well for a revival of programs such as DMP#4. 
President Kennedy moved quickly to address the issue of unemployment. He signed the 
Douglas Area Redevelopment Act in early 1961 and unshackled defense spending. (53) 
After several years of virtual nonenforcement, Kennedy also moved to revive DMP#4. 
He instructed his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to begin a vigorous 
program of directing defense contracts to labor surplus areas, dubbed Operation Booster. 
(54) Kennedy and McNamara pressured subordinates to enforce the revived policies. The 
Army's Quartermaster General in turn issued a memo to procurement officers explaining 
that it is the "duty of the Department of Army to respond to this request by exerting every 
possible effort to alleviate this most pressing economic problem.” (55) The deputy 
assistant secretary of defense for supply and logistics likewise ordered subordinates to 
take "active steps" to direct contracts to labor surplus areas. (56) 
Despite Kennedy's initial urgency, the plan proved difficult to implement. Within a year, 
supporters felt forsaken. By early 1962, Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg complained 
openly about a missile contract going to an area of California with a skilled worker 
shortage rather than to a Baltimore corporation in a labor surplus area. (57) The AFL-
CIO was soon assailing the Kennedy administration's "timid" approach to economic 
problems. (58) At a senate hearing in 1962, Senator Hubert Humphrey bitterly noted that 
the "distressed area set-aside is a policy of this Government and I think somebody ought 
to find out why it is not being implemented." Reflecting growing regional tensions over 
the issue, the Minnesotan suggested the military perhaps was "too busy wanting to get out 
to the sunshine, where they can just flit around out there on the beach.” (59) 
The partial recovery of the economy removed the immediate imperative for Operation 
Booster. More than sun worship and returning prosperity, however, was behind the 
desertion of preferential policies under Kennedy. Following President Eisenhower's 
farewell address warning about the "military industrial complex," and the increasing 
expression of concern on the part of economists such as Seymour Melman, President 
Kennedy--through Robert McNamara--launched a crusade to depoliticize, modernize, and 
reorganize defense procurement. (60) Under Budget Director David Bell, Kennedy 
initiated an extensive study of defense contracting, with the help of a grant from the Ford 
Foundation. The Bell report, issued in 1962, uncovered significant waste in defense 
contracting. To organized labor, a certain level of inefficiency was acceptable if the result 
was jobs. Such was not McNamara's view. 
Using the Bell report he helped craft, the secretary of defense set out to impose a new 
business-like efficiency on the military-industrial complex. He consolidated the far-
reaching procurement offices of the military into one body, the Defense Supply Agency 
(DSA), to be guided by the principle of keeping inventories low and "buying only what 
we need at the lowest price possible." Previously, most military contracting had been 
placed through a system known as "cost-plus" contracting, allowing contractors to charge 
for costs incurred plus a guaranteed profit. In certain cases, as McNamara persistently 
bemoaned, a contractor might actually jeopardize profits if he reduced costs. In place of 
such contracts, McNamara proposed "fixed-price" or "price-incentive contracts" in which 
contractors took greater risks and earned rewards for efficiency. (61) 
McNamara, like Wilson before him, a former automobile executive, saw little reason to 
consult a "special interest" like the AFL-CIO in policymaking and saw little to be gained 
from labor officials operating in his department at cross purposes with his efficiency-
driven efforts. The secretary flatly rejected George Meany's nomination of AFL-CIO 
Vice President Joseph Keenan to be the assistant secretary of defense for manpower 
issues. (62) Throughout the Kennedy presidency, organized labor complained loudly, as 
they had during the Eisenhower administration, of a lack of representation on key defense 
decision-making bodies. (63) Without an official representative in the Defense 
Department, labor could do virtually nothing to block McNamara initiatives, such as 
reversing the 1933 "Buy American" Act and opening up bidding for the construction of 
small naval vessels to foreign competition. (64) 
In spite of his early endorsement of Operation Booster, McNamara later publicly 
disavowed any social role for defense spending. "We don't propose to turn the defense 
industry into a WPA. We are going to buy what we need and only what we need," he 
announced. (65) In 1964, McNamara rejected a proposal to revive "set-aside programs" 
from their dormant state. AFL-CIO economist Nate Goldfinger lamented that "there is 
apparently a feeling on the part of McNamara that the defense program should not be 
called upon to cope with problems of the economy.” (66) 
To those seeking limits on the military-industrial complex, McNamara was a hero, at 
least momentarily. (67) In 1964, McNamara claimed to have saved the nation $4.1 billion 
dollars. (68) The secretary closed bases, streamlined operations, and reined in 
contractors. But the AFL-CIO saw only job losses at a time when unemployment 
remained well above full-employment levels due to automation, increasing foreign 
competition, and slow economic growth. George Meany worried about the 8,500 civilian 
jobs eliminated in 1963 because of base closings. (69) In a speech at a DOD industry 
briefing, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer William Schnitzler responded to McNamara by 
insisting that "[w]e in the labor movement don't want a new WPA whose first two initials 
stand, not for 'Works Progress' but for 'Weapons Production.'" Schnitzler insisted that 
labor was concerned about waste, but added: "we are against the kind of waste 
represented by unemployment and community bankruptcy. We do not believe that 
eliminating waste on one front ought to create waste on another.” (70) 
Although military spending remained an enormous component of the national economy 
during and after the McNamara era, the nature of the military-industrial complex changed 
significantly. Under more restrictive contract provisions, defense dollars no longer 
guaranteed profits. Between 1965 and 1969, the profits of defense contractors Lockheed 
Aircraft, General Dynamics, and General Electric all fell--despite the Vietnam conflict. 
The effects of increasing inflation after 1965 rendered fixed-price contracts an ever-
growing risk. (71) By the mid-1960s, contracts granted to labor-surplus areas no longer 
ensured the temporary economic relief on which more permanent recovery might be 
built. (72) 
Thus on the eve of the Vietnam War, organized labor's hopes of reviving its defense 
spending agenda essentially came to naught. The conflict in Southeast Asia introduced 
new complex dynamics into the equation. Philip Foner and others have linked the AFL-
CIO's "unstinting support" for the war to its desire to create jobs for its membership. (73) 
While the AFL-CIO's anticommunism was grounded in an idealistic hatred for 
communism separate from pecuniary issues, the logic of military Keynesianism certainly 
undergirded the labor federation's calls for a hard line on Cold War issues. Organized 
labor deeply believed that the American economy could thrive producing both guns and 
butter--preferably with guns produced in such a way as to promote plentiful and equal 
distribution of butter. The McNamara-controlled defense establishment, however, hardly 
allowed for this eventuality. 
Critics of American organized labor almost unanimously lament labor's support for the 
military-industrial complex as the product of shortsightedness and an unfortunate 
corporate compact, producing few gains for workers while imperiling the world. Indeed, 
the image of trade unions vigorously supporting defense spending did much to widen the 
rift between the labor movement and the New Left during the 1960s. Realistically, 
however, had trade union leaders taken a public posture of opposition or even skepticism 
toward the Cold War and the evolving military-industrial complex, they risked political 
alienation and a potential economic backlash against their membership. Still, a greater 
appreciation of the dangers of a rapidly expanding peacetime military might have served 
labor better in the eyes of its critics and some of its membership. 
A full evaluation of labor's defense policy, however, must take into account its creative 
efforts to mold military outlays into economic tools. In the military-industrial complex, 
labor found a venue somewhat removed from the cold forces of the market; it hoped, and 
managed to some extent, to harness defense spending for its social and economic agenda. 
Certainly organized labor's success was limited--although not to workers who enjoyed 
jobs as a result of DMP#4 and increased military spending. At the time, few alternatives 
existed. Even during labor's supposed heyday of the 1940s and 1950s, substantial 
economic, political, social, and cultural forces circumscribed the capacity of trade unions 
to shape their own destinies. And even when working within the system as a supporter of 
the military-industrial complex, labor met substantial resistance from an antagonistic 
military, conservative politicians, and civilian businessmen, hostile to organized labor 
and determined to apply the logic of the market to the military-industrial complex. Facing 
these forces, labor struggled to make the best of what it had. 
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